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Abstract 
The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment clarified 
and modernized a field that had become muddled since the publication of 
the Restatement (First) in 1937.  One area of modernization relates to the 
changes in law towards women, particularly changes in law toward female 
cohabitants.  Published in 2011, the Restatement (Third) added a new 
Section 28, which rejected the view that it would be immoral for one 
cohabitant to bring suit against the other, and relaxed the restriction on 
recovery in unjust enrichment for “gratuitous” contributions.  This Article 
reviews societal and legal changes for women since 1937 and notes that, in 
adding Section 28, the Restatement (Third) followed the methodology of the 
Restatement (First).  The Article reviews the principles of restitution and 
demonstrates how Section 28 follows them.  Section 28 is a welcome 
addition to the law of restitution, but the author suggests that some of the 
recoveries described in the illustrations are inadequate.  For example, 
since homemaking services do not have a market value, attempting to put a 
monetary value on them tends to undervalue them.  Limiting recovery to the 
value of services also ignores the concept of tracing the value of one’s 
contribution to an asset and recovering the enhanced value of the 
asset.  The name in which the assets are titled should not negate the value 
of the contributions of the partner without nominal ownership.  On the 
other hand, some illustrations to Section 28 describe adequate remedies, 
including sharing assets.  The author notes the complexity inherent in 
measuring value in nonmarket, nonmarriage situations, but recommends 
that the illustrations with the more generous recoveries are appropriate for 
avoiding the unjust enrichment of one partner. 
 Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law; A.B.,
Wellesley College; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law.  This project was several 
years in the making.  I would like to thank my Dean’s Fellows, Lucy Colby, Megan 
McKinney, and Kathleen Curtis for their excellent research, and I would like to thank the 
American University, Washington College of Law Research Fund for generously supporting 
this project. 
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I. Introduction
The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment endorses 
the modern view that a partner in a marriage-like relationship may recover 
in unjust enrichment from the one who left with jointly created assets.  In 
doing so, the Restatement (Third) is following the example of the 
Restatement (First) of Restitution, which endorsed the then modern view 
that a putative wife, one who thought she was married, could recover in 
unjust enrichment from her "spouse."  Both Restatements rejected the 
reasoning of cases that denied recovery to women (usually women) because 
they were in illicit, or meretricious, relationships.  The Restatement (First) 
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justified its rejection of this bar because the putative wife was the victim of 
deception or mistake.  The Restatement (Third) rejects the bar on the 
ground that denying recovery to one partner can enrich the other, equally 
illicit, partner.  The late Professor John Dawson, a leading voice in the 
articulation of the doctrine of restitution and unjust enrichment, would 
approve. 
The addition of Section 28, Unmarried Cohabitants, to the Restatement 
(Third) is a good step toward protecting the frustrated expectations of 
financially vulnerable, trusting people, some of whom raised families with 
their prior "spouse."  It raises many questions about the scope of relief, 
however.  The enriched cohabitant frequently leaves with his (usually his) 
future security unchanged.  His partner often may have little earned income 
of her own.  Section 28 has differing emphases about the value of 
homemaking and helpmate services.  Some Illustrations describe recoveries 
that involve sharing assets created during the relationship.  Illustration 11, 
however, describes a woman who was an essential part of her partner’s 
business and contributed ideas that helped it grow substantially.  She would 
only be entitled to salary for that period but not any part of the increase in 
the business from her contributions (the "traceable product" from her 
services). 
In this Article I explain why I think Professor Dawson would approve 
of the addition of Section 28, which would explicitly make restitution 
available to cohabitants who live as if they were married.  I describe how 
the addition of Section 28 to the Restatement (Third) is consistent with the 
original Restatement’s methodology and with changes in society, 
particularly for women.  I then describe the law of restitution and how 
Section 28 fits into it.  I conclude by describing various remedies illustrated 
in Section 28 and the questions raised by them. 
II. Section 28 and Professor Dawson
Watching the Reporter, Professor Andrew Kull, put together the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, I was impressed 
by the gargantuan amount of work he did for more than ten years 
researching the field.  How skillfully he analyzed and drafted.  How kind he 
was in considering all suggestions.  How painstaking he was putting 
everything together to be correct and fair. 
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Professor John Dawson, whose contributions to the field of restitution 
and unjust enrichment were enormous,
1
 would be pleased.  He said in his 
book, Unjust Enrichment, written less than fifteen years after publication of 
the Restatement (First) that "any highly developed legal system needs 
restitution remedies and cannot get on without them."
2
  He was concerned, 
however, that "the practical limitations of our own working method [makes 
us] less generous than we could otherwise afford to be."
3
  In the fifty years 
since Professor Dawson wrote Unjust Enrichment, the law of restitution has 
developed substantially, enabling Professor Kull and the ALI to compile a 
new Restatement that describes a modern working method for analyzing 
claims in restitution. 
Professor Kull sifted through more than seventy years of judicial and 
scholarly analysis since the original Restatement of Restitution appeared.  
He brought clarity to a field that had become muddled with inconsistency, 
with an eye favoring the more modern judicial formulations.  This accords 
with the ALI’s expressed goal for Restatements, that they provide "clear 
formulations of common law and its statutory elements or variations and 
reflect the law as it presently stands or might be plausibly stated by a 
court."
4
  Inevitably, stating "the law as it presently stands" required that 
choices be made.  The delicacy of the process of so "restating" the law is 
well explained by Professor Doug Rendleman in his article Restating 
Restitution.
5
  Those choices for the Restatement (Third) have been made 
adroitly and fairly by Professor Kull. 
III.  Overview of Restitution 
Just as breach of contract and tort are substantive areas providing 
sources of liability, so too is restitution.
6
  The remedies in both contract and 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Candace S. Kovacic, Applying Restitution to Remedy a Discriminatory Denial 
of Partnership, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 743, 770 n.115 (1983) ("In his book, Professor 
Dawson discussed analytic problems in the area of restitution, but not from the point of view 
that restitution should be abandoned . . . but rather that it should be better analyzed so that it 
can be given wider application.").  
 2. JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 150 (1951). 
 3. Id. at 127. 
 4. American Law Institute, Projects, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
projects.main (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 5. Doug Rendleman, Restating Restitution:  The Restatement Process and Its Critics, 
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 933, 942–43 (2008). 
 6. See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 
1277, 1284–85 (1989). 
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tort cases generally measure a plaintiff’s loss:  in contract, compensation for 
loss of plaintiff’s bargain; in tort, compensation for losses to a plaintiff’s 
person or property.  Unlike recovery in contract and tort actions, however, 
recovery in restitution is not based on what a plaintiff lost; rather, it 
measures what a defendant gained unjustly at a plaintiff’s expense.7  As I 
wrote in 1983, "the many definitions of restitution articulated throughout 
the years consistently contain the following three elements:  ‘(1) the 
defendant has been enriched by the receipt of a benefit; (2) the defendant’s 
enrichment is at the plaintiff’s expense; and, (3) it would be unjust to allow 
the defendant to retain the benefit.’"8  Besides quoting from Section 1 of the 
Restatement (First) of Restitution, I referenced Dean J.B. Ames’s and 
Professor William A. Kenner’s writings from the late 1800s, which listed 
those three basic elements in the context of the legal action referred to as 
quasi-contract.
9
  Recognizing that the same elements were present in the 
equitable principles of constructive trust, Warren A. Seavey and Austin W. 
Scott, the Reporters of the Restatement (First), put quasi-contract and 
constructive trust together in that one Restatement, published in 1937.
10
  As 
Professor Douglas Laycock said:  "This was a major accomplishment; it 
created the field."
11
  Professor Dawson recognized the potential scope of the 
field.  He said: 
My own conclusion is that restitution remedies in our law have a roving 
commission.  The generalizations now built around them and the 
techniques they provide have implications that reach in every direction, 
in unsuspected ways.  No area is marked off as exempt.  We have not 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See Kovacic, supra note 1, at 764–67; Laycock, supra note 6, at 1285–86; see also 
Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property 
or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 504 (1980) (stating that restitution 
prevents unjust enrichment:  torts repair wrongfully inflicted damage). 
 8. Kovacic, supra note 1, at 757–59 (citations omitted). 
 9. See WILLIAM A. KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS 16 
(1893) ("[N]o one shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another."); 
J.B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 53, 64 (1888) ("Quasi-contracts are 
founded . . . upon the fundamental principle of justice that no one ought unjustly to enrich 
himself at the expense of another."); see also 3 FREDRICK WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI-
CONTRACTS 4 (1913) (stating that quasi-contracts are "legal obligations arising . . . from the 
receipt of a benefit the retention of which is unjust, and requiring the obligor to make 
restitution"), quoted in Kovacic, supra note 1, at 757 n.72. 
 10. See GRAHAM DOUTHWAITE, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO RESTITUTION § 8.1, at 323 
(1977) (noting that restitution derives from both common law and equity, both of which are 
based on the principle that "recovery of a benefit should be allowed where one has received 
the benefit under circumstances which render it unjust that he should retain it" (citations 
omitted)), quoted in Kovacic, supra note 1, at 757 n. 72.  
 11. Laycock, supra note 6, at 1278.  
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yet absorbed all the contributions that they made or foreseen those still 
in the making.
12
 
In contrast to Professor Dawson’s statement that restitution remedies 
have a "roving commission" and "implications that reach in every 
direction," some have criticized the field as too vague or broad.  Some have 
even quoted his comment that when "formulated as a generalization, [unjust 
enrichment] has the peculiar faculty of inducing quite sober citizens to 
jump right off the dock."
13
  In context, however, it would appear that the 
statement does not suggest that restitution is a narrow field, but rather "that 
it should be better analyzed so that it can be given wider application."
14
 
Not only do critics ignore Professor Dawson’s concern that limitations 
of the method of analysis of restitution limited its generosity, but they also 
ignore the analyses of Judge Learned Hand and the Reporters of the 
Restatement (First) of Restitution.
15
  Judge Hand pointed out that if unjust 
enrichment is vague, so too are the concepts of the "ordinar[y] prudent 
man" and "enjoyment of land."
16
  Reporters Seavey and Scott noted that the 
concepts of "promises" in contract law and "wrong" and "harm" in tort law 
are no more narrow than the concept of restitution.
17
  They said that what 
had been required in tort and contract law was "a large number of 
individual rules to determine when relief will be given," and that the same 
would be required for restitution:  "[A]n extensive set of individual rules to 
spell out what is meant by ‘unjust.’"18  In the years since Judge Hand and 
                                                                                                                 
 12. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 117. 
 13. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 8; see also, e.g., Daniel Friedmann, supra note 7, at 
504–05 ("The concept of unjust enrichment is notoriously difficult to define.  It has on 
occasion been regarded as too indefinite and vague to be recognized as a general legal 
principle . . . ." (citations omitted)); Dale A. Oesterle, 79 MICH. L. REV. 336, 337 (1980) 
(reviewing G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978)) ("Restitution is a term that 
describes a variety of common law rights . . . ."); Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice:  
Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 716 (2006) ("[T]he law of 
restitution is both potent and poorly understood.  In these circumstances, it seems 
appropriate to recall Professor Dawson’s warning that when "formulated as a generalization, 
[unjust enrichment] has the peculiar faculty of inducing quite sober citizens to jump right off 
the dock." (citations omitted)). 
 14. Kovacic, supra note 1, at 770 n.115. 
 15. See id. at 771–72 (noting Judge Learned Hand’s defense of quasi-contract law).  
For further discussion of the historical development, criticism and defense of restitution as a 
cause of action, see generally id. at 761–74 and accompanying footnotes. 
 16. Learned Hand, Restitution or Unjust Enrichment, 11 HARV. L. REV. 249, 250 
(1898). 
 17. Warren A. Seavey & Austin W. Scott, Restitution, 54 LAW Q. REV. 29, 36 (1938). 
 18. Id. 
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Reporters Seavey and Scott wrote, courts have developed a large number of 
individual rules to determine when relief will be given, albeit with 
confusions and inconsistencies.  Professor Kull was able to draw from these 
rules to put together the Restatement (Third).  This much needed work 
should minimize if not eliminate much of the confusion about the field. 
Despite the publication of the Restatement (First) in 1937, restitution 
had not been well understood.  "As Professor Dawson said in 1951, ‘it is 
doubtful even now whether most lawyers have an adequate conception of 
the range and resources of the remedy.’"19  It is doubtful whether the field is 
any better understood sixty years later.  Judges and lawyers have found 
restitution confusing, at least in part, because the term has many synonyms, 
some of which, such as "quasi-contract," create confusion with contract 
law,
20
 and because the term at times has dual meanings as either a cause of 
action or a remedy.
21
  In addition, some judges and lawyers view restitution 
as available only if "the remedy at law is inadequate,"
22
 which raises the 
question:  Which law? 
The Restatement (Third) clarifies the meaning of the many synonyms 
for restitution and adds the phrase "Unjust Enrichment" to the title to 
emphasize that they are overlapping topics.
23
  Despite the fact that they are 
not always used synonymously, the Restatement (Third) uses the terms that 
way, unless the context requires a distinction.
24
  It makes clear that because 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Kovacic, supra note 1, at 761 (quoting DAWSON, supra note 2, at 22); see also 
DOUTHWAITE, supra note 10, § 1.1, at 2 (noting that a practitioner usually does not recognize 
"the restitutionary implications or potential of the problem before him"), quoted in Kovacic 
supra note 1, at 761 n.90; Laycock, supra note 6, at 1277 ("Despite its importance, 
restitution is a relatively neglected and underdeveloped part of the law."). 
 20. See Kovacic, supra note 1, at 761–63. 
 21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch. 7, intro. 
note (2011) ("The awkwardness of using the word ‘restitution’ to identify both a claim based 
on unjust enrichment and the corresponding remedy means that this simple division of the 
overall subject matter is not always apparent from its terminology."); see also Laycock, 
supra note 6, at 1279–83 (discussing the many meanings of "restitution"). 
 22. See CANDACE KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, JEAN LOVE AND GRANT NELSON, EQUITABLE 
REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES:  CASES AND MATERIALS, 547–48 (8th ed. 2010) 
(identifying cases that require an adequate legal remedy before considering a restitution 
claim). 
 23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. c 
(2011) ("The title of the present Restatement incorporates both terms—not to imply that they 
are correlatives, much less synonyms, but to convey as clearly and immediately as possible 
an accurate idea of the overlapping topics treated herein.").  
 24. See id. ("When used in this Restatement to refer to a theory of liability or a body of 
legal doctrine, the terms ‘restitution’ and ‘unjust enrichment’ will generally be treated as 
synonymous.  Any more particular meaning that the words may carry should be clear from 
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restitution is a source of liability,
25
 the idea that it is available only if the 
remedy at law is inadequate for a different liability does not make sense.  
IV.  Restatement (First) of Restitution from 1937 and Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment from 2010 Compared 
A.  The Restatement (First) and Cohabitation 
In 1937, when the Restatement (First) of Restitution appeared, 
unmarried cohabitation was socially unacceptable.  Both before and 
after the appearance of the Restatement (First), courts based their 
decisions to deny recovery to unmarried cohabitants on moral judgments 
about "meretricious" or "illegitimate" relationships.
26
  Statements in 
Brown v. Tuttle,
27
 an early case from Maine, typified those attitudes.  
There a woman, who lived with a man "as husband and wife" from 1871 
to 1884, brought suit to recover money she had loaned him and payment 
for her services after he left her to marry another woman.
28
  In denying 
recovery, the court did not discuss whether the parties had a common 
law marriage or whether the woman was deceived into thinking that she 
was married.  Nor did the court consider who benefitted and who lost by 
its decision.  Refusing to imply a promise that her "husband" should 
repay her loan or pay her for her services, the court said:  
The parties were living together in violation of the principles of 
morality and chastity, as well as of the positive law of the state; a 
relation to which the court can lend no sanction.  The services 
rendered, as well as the money furnished, were in furtherance, and 
for the continuation of that unlawful relation.  The law will imply no 
promise to pay for either.  If there had been an express promise for 
such a purpose, the court would not enforce it.
29
  
                                                                                                                 
the context.").  
 25. See id. cmt. a ("The identification of unjust enrichment as an independent basis of 
liability in common-law legal systems . . . was the central achievement of the 1937 
Restatement of Restitution.  That conception of the subject is carried forward here.").  
 26. See e.g., Swires v. Parsons, 5 Watts & Serg. 357, 358 (Pa. 1843) ("The evidence 
establishes one of two things, either that the plaintiff and intestate were married, or that she 
was living in a state of concubinage . . . .  Either position is fatal to the claim for 
compensation . . . .").  
 27. See Brown v. Tuttle, 13 A. 583 (Me. 1888). 
 28. Id. at 583.  
 29. Id. at 584. 
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Similarly, shortly after the Restatement (First) appeared, the 
Appellate Court in Illinois denied recovery to a female cohabitant who 
sought payment for her services from her cohabitant’s estate.30  
Testimony in Usalatz v. Pleshe’s Estate31 showed that people in the 
community and decedent’s family thought that she and the decedent 
were married, that the decedent referred to her as his wife, and that she 
used his name.  The jury found against her, however, because she knew 
she was not married.  The Appellate Court affirmed.  The court said that 
while the decedent’s conduct "was a deception upon the public," the 
evidence "does not make a prima facie case of her being deceived by 
any fraud of the decedent."
32
 The court then held: 
It is a well-settled rule that a woman who knowingly and voluntarily 
lives in illicit relations with a man cannot recover on an implied 
contract for services rendered him during such relationship.  Not 
only does the relationship as of husband and wife negative that of 
master and servant, but, such cohabitation being in violation of 
principles of morality and chastity, and so against public policy, the 
law will not imply a promise to pay for services rendered under such 
circumstances.
33
 
Neither court discussed the morality and chastity of the men in the 
relationships. 
Despite societal disapprobation of a woman who lived with a man 
"in violation of the principles of morality and chastity," the Restatement 
(First) of Restitution addressed cohabitation in its chapters on mistake 
and fraud,
34
 approving the exception articulated but not applied in 
Usalatz.  The Restatement recommended recovery in restitution for a 
putative spouse, one who thought she was married but was not because 
of the fraud or mistake of the "quasi-husband."
35
  That was not the 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Usalatz v. Pleshe’s Estate, 23 N.E.2d 939, 939–42 (Ill. 1939). 
 31. See id. at 942. 
 32. Id. at 941. 
 33. Id. at 942 (quoting Stewart v. Waterman, 123 A. 524, 526 (Vt. 1924)). 
 34. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION ch. 2, topic 2 (1937); id. at 
ch. 7. 
 35. See id. § 40 reporter’s note a ("Whether or not the defendant was fraudulent, the 
older cases refused recovery on an implied contract and indicated that the wife was relegated 
to a tort action, usually useless because it did not survive the death of the pseudo husband as 
the contract action did."); id. § 134 cmt. a, illus. 2 ("A, a married man, fraudulently purports 
to marry B, who does not know that A is married.  Believing that she is A’s wife, B renders 
services to A.  B is entitled to recover the reasonable value of her services, less the value of 
benefits received by her."); see also id. § 40 cmt. b ("The rule . . . is applicable both where 
the services are obtained by a consciously false statement and where they are the result of an 
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unanimous view of the courts at the time, as the Reporters noted:  
"[W]hether or not the defendant was fraudulent, the older cases refused 
recovery on an implied contract."
36
  The Reporters chose, however, to 
follow those more generous later cases that "tend to allow relief in this 
situation."
37
  
B.  Societal Changes Between 1937 and 2010 
The "later cases" referred to in the Restatement (First) were modern 
at the time.  Of course, what was modern in 1937 is no longer modern.  
In their note to Section 40, Reporters Seavey and Scott discussed 
putative marriages only in the context of putative wives.  They may well 
have concluded that women, more than men, were the ones who were 
hurt "in this situation,"
38
 particularly given the lack of employment 
opportunities for women at the time. 
Much has changed for women since then.  Putative wives routinely 
recover in unjust enrichment from their deceitful "husbands."
39
  While in 
1937 women had been voting for less than twenty years, today they have 
been voting for almost one hundred, and women hold many elected 
offices.
40
  In 1937 employers could pay women less than men for the 
same work and could keep them out of the workplace altogether 
if they so chose.
41
  About twenty-five years later, the Equal Pay 
                                                                                                                 
innocent but material misstatement.  The fact that the one rendering the services does not 
expect to be compensated therefor or otherwise to receive benefit is immaterial."); id. § 40 
cmt. b, illus. 3 ("Mistakenly believing that he is properly divorced, A represents to B that he 
is single and goes through a ceremony of marriage . . . .  A becomes sick and B assumes 
charge of family affairs, rendering personal service to A and supporting him by her earnings.  
B is entitled to restitution."). 
 36. Id. § 40 reporter’s note a. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. b (2011) 
(contrasting restitution available under Section 28 for a cohabitant with restitution available 
under the sections of misrepresentation or mistake for a putative spouse). 
 40. The Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which 
conferred on women the right to vote, was approved in 1920.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 41. See Claudia Goldin, Understanding the Gender Gap:  An Economic History of 
American Women, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY:  LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 17, 20 (Paul Burstein ed., 1994) (indicating that the difference between 
men’s and women’s earnings throughout much of history, and to some extent today, can be 
attributed to "wage discrimination"). 
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Act
42
 amendment in 1963 to the Fair Labor Standards Act
43
 and Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited those practices.
44
   
Prior to 1971, states could pass laws that distinguished between men 
and women merely by noting that men and women are different from one 
another.  For example, in 1948 the United States Supreme Court upheld, 
against a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, a Michigan statute that 
prohibited women from working as bartenders unless they were the wife or 
daughter of a male bar owner.
45
  Justice Frankfurter, noting that "alewives" 
according to Shakespeare, were "sprightly and ribald" said:  
[b]eguiling as the subject is, it need not detain us long. . . .  Michigan 
could, beyond question, forbid all women from working behind a 
bar.  This is so despite the vast changes in the social and legal position 
of women.  The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that 
men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices 
that men have long practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing 
a sharp line between the sexes . . . .
46
 
The Court held that the exception for wives and daughters was not 
irrational as the Michigan legislature could have thought women bartenders 
might "give rise to moral and social problems" that could be lessened by 
"the oversight . . . by a barmaid’s husband or father," and that the 
legislature, which did not bar women from being waitresses in bars, did not 
need to address every aspect of the problem.
47
  Justice Rutledge for the 
dissent would have held that the statute’s distinction was "invidious," 
pointing out that the male bar owner did not need to be present when his 
wife or daughter tended bar.
48
  In 1971, however, in a case involving a state 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See Equal Pay Act of 1963, PUB. L. NO. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1962) ("No employer 
having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate . . . between 
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate 
less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal 
work . . . ."). 
 43. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006) (establishing minimum wage, overtime pay, 
recordkeeping, and youth employment standards affecting employees in the private sector 
and in Federal, State, and local governments). 
 44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) ("It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.").  
 45. Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465–67 (1948). 
 46. Id. at 465–66. 
 47. Id. at 466. 
 48. Id. at 468 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
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statute preferring men over women as administrators of estates, the 
Supreme Court held that laws distinguishing between men and women must 
have "a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation" and not 
be validated merely for administrative convenience.
49
  
Much has also changed since 1937 in how the law regulates morality.  
In most states cohabitation and adultery are no longer criminal.
50
  
Homosexuality is no longer criminal,
51
 and societal views about same-sex 
marriage are not uniform.  The incidence of cohabitation has increased 
substantially and is generally viewed with less disapproval than at the time 
the Restatement (First) appeared.
52
  In some cases a "stay-at-home-dad" is 
the complainant.
53
  Not all courts view the woman, solely, as the "guilty" 
party.  As Judge Shirley Abrahamson of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
said in In re Steffes
54
 in 1980:  "Why should the estate be enriched when 
that man was just as much a part of the illicit relationship as she."
55  
The 
dissent in Steffes, however, was still of the view that "this court ought not to 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
 50. See Brandon Campbell, Comment, Cohabitation Agreements in Massachusetts:  
Wilcox v. Trautz Changes the Rules But Not the Results, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 485, 489 
(2000) (indicating that "cohabitation was a criminal offense in Massachusetts until 1987"); 
Jonathan Turley, Criminal Adultery:  States Ponder the Continuation of Puritanical Laws, 
JONATHAN TURLEY RES IPSA LOQUITUR (Apr. 26, 2010), http://jonathanturley.org/ 
2010/04/26/criminal-adultery-states-ponder-the-continuation-of-puritanical-law (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2011) (chronicling the history of criminal adultery statutes and states’ decisions 
whether to repeal those statutes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see, 
e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.30 (2004) ("Any person who shall commit adultery shall be 
guilty of a felony; and when the crime is committed between a married woman and a man 
who is unmarried, the man shall be guilty of adultery, and liable to the same punishment."). 
 51. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (invalidating the criminality 
of homosexuality).  
 52. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 109 (Cal. 1976) (stating that in the fifteen 
years since 1960 the number of cohabiting couples increased substantially); Goode v. 
Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 436 (W.Va. 1990) (stating that the number of couples living 
together increased substantially between 1970 and 1990); see also Terry S. Kogan, 
Competing Approaches to Same-Sex Versus Opposite-Sex, Unmarried Couples in Domestic 
Partnership Laws and Ordinances, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1023, 1025 n.5 (stating that 
cohabitation in the United States increased 400 percent between 1980 and 2000, representing 
4.1 million of the approximately 93 million U.S. households in 1997). 
 53. See Costa v. Oliven, 849 N.E.2d 122, 125 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that a male 
cohabitant who cared for the home and child was unable to recover from the female 
cohabitant, in whose name property was titled because of Illinois precedent against one 
cohabitant recovering from the other). 
 54. See In re Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 705 (Wis. 1980) (holding that there was 
sufficient evidence to "support the trial court’s finding that there was an implied promise to 
pay for the services plaintiff rendered"). 
 55. Id. at 706. 
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allow [plaintiff] to assert a right to compensation growing out of a 
relationship which offends the standards of decency of any age."
56
 
Some things have not changed, however.  Women’s wages on average 
are still less than men’s.57  Women are still more often than men the 
primary caregivers at home and are still more often than men financially 
hurt when a relationship ends.
58
  Because many couples now live in 
marriage-like relationships, if laws of the past are imported to modern day, 
many women will continue to be hurt.
59
 
C.  Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment 
and Cohabitation 
As the Restatement (Third) notes, many cases decided in the later part 
of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century have 
allowed one cohabitant from a terminated relationship to recover from the 
other.
60
  Just as at the time of publication of the Restatement (First) not all 
courts recognized unjust enrichment claims of putative wives,
61
 at the time 
of publication of the Restatement (Third) not all courts recognized unjust 
enrichment claims of knowingly unmarried cohabitants.
62
  For example, in 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. at 712 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
 57. See Laura Fitzpatrick, Why Do Women Still Earn Less Than Men?, TIME (Apr. 20, 
2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1983185,00.html#ixzz1Eepcu53R 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (indicating that, as of 2008, the average woman only earned 
seventy-seven cents for every dollar earned by a man and that the disparity is even greater 
among black and Hispanic women) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 58. Diana Pearce, The Feminization of Ghetto Poverty, 21 SOCIETY 70, 70 (1983). 
 59. See Kogan, supra note 52, at 1027 (suggesting that extending legal recognition to 
cohabiting couples embraces "fairness, tolerance, and diversity"). 
 60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 reporter’s 
note a (2011) (noting twentieth and twenty-first century decisions). 
 61. See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text (identifying cases where putative 
wives were unable to recover). 
 62. Section 28 applies to both homosexual and heterosexual partnerships.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 28 cmt. b ("For the purposes of this section, a ‘relationship 
resembling marriage’ includes a relationship between persons of the same sex.").  The fact 
that women are more likely to be financially hurt when relationships end than men is not 
limited to heterosexual partnerships.  In a homosexual relationship it is possible for one of 
the partners to assume the gendered role of "wife."  Any cohabitant, man or woman, who is 
the helper to his or her partner’s financial success at the expense of his or her own is 
financially harmed when a relationship terminates.  This Article will speak of abandoned 
women, using this as a proxy for anyone who takes on a traditionally female gendered role 
in the same situation. 
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denying a cohabitant’s claim, a 2004 case in Illinois63 followed the 
reasoning of its Supreme Court in Hewitt v. Hewitt
64
 from 1979.  The court 
in Hewitt expressed the attitude that morality should be the basis for 
deciding whether or not to allow a claimant to recover.  There, the plaintiff 
and defendant had lived together for fifteen years, had three children, and 
had represented themselves as married.  The plaintiff claimed that the 
defendant had promised to share everything with her and that she had 
worked and borrowed money from her parents to help him with his dental 
education and establishment of his periodontal practice.  After their 
separation, the woman brought suit.  The Illinois trial court dismissed the 
suit, but the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed, holding that when the 
relationship is a "stable family relationship" like a marriage, the plaintiff 
should be allowed to recover.
65
  In reinstating the trial court’s verdict, 
however, the Supreme Court of Illinois wrote:  "We do not intend to 
suggest that plaintiff’s claims are totally devoid of merit,"66 but the court 
questioned whether allowing recovery to a woman who chose "to enter into 
what have heretofore been commonly referred to as ‘illicit’ or 
‘meretricious’ relationships," would "encourage formation of such 
relationships and weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based 
society?"
67
  The court did not question whether relieving Mr. Hewitt of any 
responsibility when he also chose to enter into the same "illicit" or 
"meretricious" relationship would encourage men to form illicit 
relationships and weaken marriage.  
The court in Hewitt left the parties as they were because the issue 
involved matters of public policy, which the court said were the province of 
the legislature.  In so holding, the court said:  
We are aware, of course, of the increasing judicial attention given the 
individual claims of unmarried cohabitants to jointly accumulated 
property, and the fact that the majority of courts considering the 
question have recognized an equitable or contractual basis for 
implementing the reasonable expectations of the parties unless sexual 
services were the explicit consideration. . . .  Of substantially greater 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See Costa v. Oliven, 849 N.E.2d 122, 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (following Hewitt).  
For background knowledge on this case see supra note 53. 
 64. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979) (holding "that plaintiff’s 
claims are unenforceable for the reason that they contravene public policy, implicit in the 
statutory scheme of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, disfavoring the 
grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants").  
 65. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454, 460 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). 
 66. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211. 
 67. Id. at 1207. 
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importance than the rights of the immediate parties is the impact of such 
recognition upon our society and the institution of marriage.
68
 
The court expressed concern that if it allowed Mrs. Hewitt to recover, its 
decision could affect the laws of inheritance, wrongful death, workers’ 
compensation, and children’s rights, none of which were involved in Mrs. 
Hewitt’s suit.69  
Professor Peter Linzer has written about the consequences of rules that 
deny recovery to cohabitants.  Speaking of presumptions about gratuitously 
provided services and meretricious relationships, he said, "One thing that 
should be apparent, but isn’t to many people[,] is that both these rules are 
heavily loaded against women:  Women usually provide services within a 
household, and the ‘meretricious relationship’ ban will almost always leave 
a man with happy memories and a woman with nothing."
70
  To paraphrase 
John Dawson then, to be fair, restitution should be given wider application 
to prevent men from being unjustly enriched at the expense of women.
71
 
V.  Applicability of Section 28 
The Restatement (Third) did not follow those cases that denied 
recovery to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.  Rather, it added Section 28, 
which provides: 
(1) If two persons have formerly lived together in a relationship 
resembling marriage, and if one of them owns a specific asset to which 
the other has made substantial, uncompensated contributions in the form 
of property or services, the person making such contributions has a 
claim in restitution against the owner as necessary to prevent unjust 
enrichment upon the dissolution of the relationship. 
(2) The rule of subsection (1) may be displaced, modified, or 
supplemented by local domestic relations law.
72
 
By permitting one cohabitant to bring a claim in restitution against the 
other at the termination of the relationship, Section 28 rejects the moralistic 
approach that would have courts leave the parties as they were when they 
parted ways.  Section 28 comments that most jurisdictions also reject this 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Peter Linzer, Rough Justice, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 695, 705. 
 71. Kovacic, supra note 1, at 770 n.115. 
 72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 (2011).   
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moralistic approach.
73
  It recognizes that when a court refuses to award any 
of the jointly acquired but not jointly titled property to a cohabitant who has 
been left without, then the cohabitant with the property has been enriched, 
and unjustly so.  Even when courts view people who live together without 
marriage as in "meretricious" or "illicit" relationships, most modern courts 
also recognize that both parties are equally complicit.
74
 
Besides removing a total bar to recovery, Section 28 relaxes traditional 
rules regarding gifts and assumptions of risk, recognizing that couples who 
live in marriage-like relationships do not always deal with each other as 
they would anyone else.
75
  Emily Sherwin has questioned the approach of 
Section 28, arguing, inter alia, that the "intrinsic value of freedom and self-
determination" weighs in favor of providing "options for couples who wish 
to remain financially independent,"
76
 and that the parties could negotiate to 
determine their rights upon a dissolution of their relationship, even if some 
situations are complex:  "[I]n a typical restitution case, negotiating for 
payment is not necessarily a daunting prospect . . . .  [F]requently all that is 
needed is an off-the-rack legal arrangement such as a joint ownership or a 
loan."
77
  Sherwin also argues that an exemplary case granting relief 
rewarded a plaintiff whose position "read[s] like [a] Darwin Award for the 
economically naïve,"
78
 and that a competent adult who chooses to make a 
gift to another should not expect relief.
79
 
I consider the Restatement preferable.  When one partner is enriched at 
the expense of the other, often only one of the two has "remained 
financially independent."  Also, the financially dependent partner, because 
of the unique, intimate living arrangement, is not expecting to be treated as 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See id. § 28 reporter’s note a (detailing jurisdictions rejecting the moralistic 
approach).  
 74. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (noting the rationale of modern 
courts).  
 75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. c 
(2011) ("Decisions allowing restitution under § 28 involve an implicit determination that the 
contributions at issue were made on [the expectation that the donor will share in the resulting 
benefits basis]—thereby distinguishing them from ordinary gifts—and that the claimant’s 
expectation was justifiable.").  "They rest, moreover, on an implicit determination that the 
claimant should not be held to have assumed the risk that things would turn out as they 
did . . . in short, that the transaction is not one that the parties should have regulated by 
contract."  Id. 
 76. Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice:  Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 
U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 722 (2006). 
 77. Id. at 727. 
 78. Id. at 719 n.32. 
 79. Id. at 724. 
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a self-sufficient roommate, but instead is financially dependent because she 
was expecting to be taken care of.
80
  Recognizing the uniqueness of this 
plight, Section 28 created rules applicable only to it, and inapplicable to 
other home sharing relationships, such as nonmarriage-like intimate 
relationships or those involving relatives or roommates.
81
 
As Comment b notes:  "A standard objection to restitution in related 
contexts—the argument that the asserted obligation should properly have 
been the subject of a contract between the parties—is ordinarily disregarded 
when restitution is allowed between former cohabitants."
82
  Even those not 
disregarding such a future contingency may believe that planning for the 
end of a relationship through contract would indicate lack of trust.  In 
divorce cases, just division of assets is not limited to those who have signed 
prenuptial agreements.
83  
Also, not all cohabitants who have lived together 
for years, and perhaps had children together, have only simple transactions 
and know where or how to find or create an appropriate legal document.  
Not all asset-holding partners are willing to agree to contract, regardless of 
fairness or moral duties.  Thus, Section 28 recognizes that cohabitation 
creates atypical restitution cases and that the law should provide appropriate 
relief.  
Perhaps people are not wise to assume that their marriage-like 
relationships will continue, but love and intimacy do not always correlate 
with wisdom.  By the time wisdom is acquired in hindsight, one partner 
may be unjustly enriched at the expense of the other.  As the Restatement 
(Third) comments, because "unjust enrichment in these cases can be 
demonstrated only in retrospect" cohabitants do not assume the risk "that 
things would turn out as they did."
84
  Rules of law that favor the wise at the 
expense of the foolish may create injustice.  Just as Section 90 in the 
Restatements of Contracts creates an exception from some of the usual 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. c 
(2011) ("Even when a transfer between cohabitants is essentially gratuitous, it may be made 
in the expectation that the donor will share, directly or indirectly, in the resulting benefits."). 
 81. Whether rules should be relaxed in the context of other nonbusiness-like 
relationships is not addressed in this Article. 
 82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. b (2011). 
 83. Cf. Eyster v. Pechenik, 887 N.E.2d 272, 279 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (holding that 
prenuptial agreements require judicial scrutiny because "expectations that persons planning 
to marry usually have about one another can disarm their capacity for self-protective 
judgment, or their inclination to exercise it, as compared to parties negotiating commercial 
agreements") (quoting PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.02 cmt. c (2002)). 
 84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. c (2011). 
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rules of contract, such as the need for consideration to make a promise 
intended to induce reliance enforceable for people who reasonably, but 
perhaps not wisely, did rely,
85
 Section 28 creates an exception from some of 
the usual rules of restitution for unwise cohabitants. 
Illustration 3 of Section 28 describes a scenario in which restitution is 
appropriate for an enamored, presumably lonely, 56-year-old farmer who 
loses everything to a woman who ends up leaving him with nothing.
86
  The 
Restatement (Third) is concerned not with punishing naivety, but with what 
should happen to one partner whose frustrated expectations of trust and 
sharing enrich the other.  As Section 28 recognizes, this describes a 
scenario appropriate for restitution.  An action that is mean-spirited and 
opportunistic is unjust,
87
 while the just result is reimbursement of the 
claimant.  As Professor William A. Keener said in his 1893 treatise:  "[T]he 
question to be determined is not the defendant’s intention, but what in 
equity and good conscience the defendant ought to do," or what a fair-
minded person would have done.
88
 
Some believe that allowing a cohabitant to recover in unjust 
enrichment weakens the institution of marriage.
89
  Unfortunately, when 
remedies are denied to a financially vulnerable cohabitant because of lack 
of marriage, a court is punishing only one of two cohabitants by allowing 
one, not two, to be enriched.  Such an unequal outcome itself might weaken 
rather than strengthen the institution of marriage because it creates an 
incentive for the more financially savvy partner to opt out of marriage.  As 
the Supreme Court of Nevada said in reversing the dismissal of a woman’s 
claim:  "We recognize that the state has a strong public policy interest in 
encouraging legal marriage.  We do not, however, believe that policy is 
well served by allowing one participant in a meretricious relationship to 
abscond with the bulk of the couple’s acquisitions."90 
                                                                                                                 
 85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
 86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. d, illus. 
3 (2011).  This illustration is based on Sharp v. Kosmalski, 351 N.E.2d 721 (1976).  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 reporter’s note d 
(2011). 
 87. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (2011) 
(addressing profits derived from opportunistic breach). 
 88. WILLIAM A. KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS 20 (1893). 
 89. See, e.g., Sherwin, supra note 76, at 722 (stating that "[a]rguments in favor of a 
contractual approach include . . . the possibility that legal equivalence between marriage and 
cohabitation will devalue and discourage marriage"). 
 90. Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (Nev. 1984); see also Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 
2d 872, 876 n.1 (Miss. 1986) ("That we may recognize other rights arising out of the marital 
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VI.  Uncertain Remedies Obtainable in Cohabitation Cases 
A.  Overview 
The proposition that restitution is available to resolve cohabitation 
cases has slowly gained credence over the years and is now reflected in the 
Restatement (Third).  The proposition that one partner should not be 
allowed to "abscond with the bulk of the couple’s assets" has also gained 
credence.
91
  The Restatement (Third) demonstrates, however, that fertile 
ground for disputes still remains concerning the type of relief that should be 
available upon the dissolution of a marriage-like relationship.  
As discussed above, the term restitution is used to connote both a 
source of liability and a remedy.
92
  There is a similar overlap in the term 
unjust enrichment. A person who is liable in restitution is "[a] person who 
is unjustly enriched at the expense of another."
93
  The remedy is for the 
defendant to "either restore the benefit in question or its traceable product, 
or else pay money in the amount necessary to eliminate unjust 
enrichment."
94
  Thus, the unjust enrichment that creates the liability also 
measures the remedy.  
The substantive area of unjust enrichment is concerned with 
determining what type of enrichment is unjust.  Once that is determined, 
measuring the enrichment involves two considerations:  what caused the 
enrichment and what it is worth.  When the enrichment is readily 
measurable, the two considerations are the same.  The amount the 
defendant received is the amount that the defendant owes.
95
  When the 
enrichment is not monetary, however, such as the receipt of services, it 
must be translated into money. 
Measuring the value of services in cohabitation cases is particularly 
difficult.  Most unjust enrichment cases valuing services involve market 
transactions with market prices.  For example, some subcontractors, when 
                                                                                                                 
relationship provides no reason on principle why we should deny an equitable property 
division upon dissolution of a non-marital cohabitation.").   
 91. Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 437 (W. Va. 1990) (quoting Hay, 678 P.2d at 
674).  Goode is cited in the reporter’s notes.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 reporter’s note c (2011). 
 92. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011).  
 94. Id. § 1 cmt a; see also id. § 49(1). 
 95. The amount may be different than received if, for example, it can be traced into 
something more profitable or the defendant can claim a change of position.  Both of those 
possibilities raise predominantly substantive issues. 
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not paid by the general contractor with whom they contracted, seek to 
recover the market value of their work from the owner for whom their work 
was performed.  Some workers who breached a construction contract want 
to recover the excess value of their work over their customer’s losses from 
the breach.  Some plaintiffs seek compensation for design work or 
commissions based on contracts without sufficient terms or that are 
unenforceable due to the statute of frauds.
96
  The plaintiffs may not recover 
at all or may not receive all they seek, but the values generally start with a 
market or contract price. 
Not all services provided by one partner to another in a marriage-like 
relationship are market transactions, however, and therefore they are not 
easily valued.  Although it is possible to measure something that does not 
have a market value, such as loss of love and companionship of a parent, 
lost earning capacity, and pain and anguish,
97
 the nature of an intimate 
relationship makes determining the value of services within it particularly 
difficult.
98
  One partner may provide services such as raising children, 
keeping a home, or working alongside the other to acquire assets or build a 
business.  If so, the other partner probably receives money from earnings, 
investments, or other sources.  He may pay for living expenses and the like.  
When the partners separate, how, if at all, should the assets they acquired be 
divided?  If instead of apportioning the assets a court orders the defendant 
to pay the plaintiff the value of her services, how should they be valued, if 
at all? 
The difficulty in measuring unjust enrichment in marriage-like 
relationships is exacerbated by the fact that the services involved are 
typically the same as those performed within a marriage.  Every state has 
divorce laws that govern the terminations of marriage.  The laws vary.  
Many if not all have been criticized as being unfair to women.
99
  Courts 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, A Proposal to Simplify Quantum Meruit 
Litigation, 35 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 547, 587–92, 607–09, 628–34 (1986) (reviewing 
commercial cases in which plaintiffs are seeking to recover for their services, and in which 
the courts inconsistently measure them either by the market value of the services or the 
market value to the defendant). 
 97. See generally KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, LOVE & NELSON, supra note 22, at 459–97. 
 98. See Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation:  Family Law and the Romance of 
Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 994 (1995) (describing the many different 
theories for valuing services in the home). 
 99. See Alicia Brokars Kelly, Explaining Intuitions:  Relating Mergers, Contribution, 
and Loss in the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 185, 186–87 (2001) (identifying literature critiquing divorce laws and noting harm to 
women and children from those laws). 
COHABITATION AND THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 1427 
faced with having to adjudicate a property dispute between two people 
whose lifestyle is like a marriage often question the role that divorce laws 
should play.
100
  Should they apply?  If not, do they require that the award be 
less complete than a divorce settlement so that someone who is not married 
does not get the protections of marriage?  If so, how much less?  If less, 
does that mean the award is unfair?  If so, then the principle underlying 
liability in unjust enrichment, the very cause of action at issue, would be 
compromised. 
Another way divorce laws might influence cohabitation awards would 
be if a judge awarded the financially vulnerable plaintiff half of everything 
that the two acquired during the relationship on the ground that the person 
with the property should not be able to shield assets by staying single while 
acting as if married.  Another way would be to try to figure out what the 
financial condition of the party with assets would have been had he been 
truly single and subtract the difference between that and the assets acquired.  
Another is to measure the amount of involvement the financially vulnerable 
partner had in the other partner’s business and to award her that percentage 
of the profits.  Another is to measure the value of homemaking services or 
the opportunity costs of homemaking services.   
Section 28 is clear that cohabitants should no longer be barred from 
bringing suit on moral grounds.  However, its illustrations and comments 
contain some conflicts and inconsistencies about the remedies.  Some 
suggest that a plaintiff cannot recover the value of the traceable product of 
her work; others suggest she can.
101
  Some suggest that helpmate services 
are valued; others suggest they are not.
102
  The difficulty in finding a "one 
size fits all" remedy for cohabitation liability is due, no doubt, to the many 
competing policies surrounding compensation of non- or under-paid work 
in the home or in the partner’s business.103 
                                                                                                                 
 100. See e.g., Flood v. Kalinyaprak, 84 P.3d 27, 32 (Mont. 2004) (declining to apply 
divorce principles to a partition action by an unmarried couple).  
 101. See infra Part VI.C (discussing title and traceable product). 
 102. See infra Part VI.D (discussing helpmate services). 
 103. See, e.g., Laura Weinrib, Note, Reconstructing Family:  Constructive Trust at 
Relational Dissolution, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 207, 214–232 (2002) (discussing the 
competing policies implicated by questions of compensation for uncompensated domestic 
labor). 
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B.  Remedial Provisions in the Restatement (Third) 
Sections 49 through 53 of the Restatement (Third) identify a number 
of options available for measuring unjust enrichment.  Section 49 describes 
remedies that can result from monetary as well as nonmonetary 
transactions.  The latter may be "difficult to measure."
104
  Section 49(3) 
suggests five ways to quantify this hard-to-measure unjust enrichment:  
value of benefit, cost to claimant, market value of benefit, price fixed by 
agreement, or, in appropriate cases, recipient’s net profit.  Although not 
present in the black letter, some comments in Section 28 appear to suggest 
that not all of the remedies from Section 49 would be available to 
cohabitants, but Section 49 is not so restricted.  
C.  Title and Traceable Product 
One of the areas in which the illustrations in Section 28 appear to 
suggest contradictory results involves whether one cohabitant can recover a 
share of assets titled in the other’s name.  Some of the illustrations would 
deny that type of recovery, while others would allow it.  Title is 
problematic.  As early as 1957, Justice Finley of the Supreme Court of 
Washington, concurring in a cohabitation case, expressed concern about the 
rule that title determines ownership rights, saying that the rule "often 
operates to the great advantage of the cunning and the shrewd, who wind up 
with possession of the property, or title to it in their names, at the end of a 
so-called meretricious relationship."
105
 
A comment to Illustration 11, which is based on Maglica v. 
Maglica,
106
 would appear to foreclose recovering assets.  In Maglica, a 
woman whose ideas and efforts helped create an immensely profitable 
business was allowed to recover a salary but denied any part of the business 
profits because the stock was solely in her partner’s name.  Comment e to 
Section 28 reads:  "When a claimant under § 28 seeks restitution in respect 
of services, the measure of recovery is the value of the services rendered, 
not their traceable product."
107
 
                                                                                                                 
 104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49 cmt. d 
(2011). 
 105. West v. Knowles, 311 P.2d 689, 692–93 (Wash. 1957) (Finley, J., concurring).  
West was cited by, among other cases, Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121 n.21 (Cal. 
1976). 
 106. See Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Cal. Dis. Ct. App. 1998). 
 107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. e (2011). 
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On the other hand, other illustrations support recovery based on shared 
assets.  For example, under Illustration 1, a woman is entitled to an 
equitable distribution of property titled only in the man’s name because, 
despite earning less, her services to the family equalized their 
contributions.
108
  Illustration 5 notes that title to a house in one partner’s 
name does not prohibit division of its sale proceeds.
109
  
These inconsistencies raise the question whether there should be a 
significant difference between businesses and houses. 
1.  No Recovery Based on Enhanced Value of Acquired Assets 
Illustration 11 is based on both Carney v. Hansell
110
 and Maglica.  In 
Carney, Joann Carney and Christopher Hansell lived together for sixteen 
and a half years after Carney learned that she was pregnant.  She took care 
of the house and child and was "deeply involved" in Hansell’s towing 
business.  The Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, noted that 
"[t]he business was built from the ground up and both parties contributed 
substantially to its success."
111
  For the first eight years she received no 
compensation for her work in the business.  For the remainder of their time 
together, at her insistence, she received a minimal salary.  In addition, she, 
along with her family, helped gut and renovate an old house that 
defendant’s parents bought and titled in his name. 
The court would not award Carney "a percentage of the value of the 
business" because the legal requirements for a partnership, such as shared 
profits and ownership of assets, were lacking.
112
  Hansell also had told 
Carney that "he would burn the business down before she would ever get 
anything."
113
  
The court did hold that Carney was entitled to recover, at minimum 
wage rates, for the time she had worked in the business, even though "as a 
key employee to the business, there is no doubt her services were worth 
more than minimum wage, but applying another standard would be 
speculation not supported by the record."
114
  The court denied her any 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Illustration 1 is based on Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872 (Miss. 1986). 
 109. Illustration 5 is based on Pederson v. Anibas, 247 Wis. 2d 990 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 110. See Carney v. Hansell, 831 A.2d 128, 135 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2003). 
 111. Id. at 131.  
 112. Id. at 134. 
 113. Id. at 132. 
 114. Id. at 136 
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further recovery.  First the court denied Carney any division of the real 
estate properties because "she did not contribute capital to the purchase of 
the parcels [and] has no contractual claim to the properties [and] she and 
defendant are not married."
115
  Second, the court said:  
There is a separation between plaintiff’s role as home maker, mother 
and housemate, and her role as a key employee of the business.  As to 
the former role as homemaker, claims for compensation for services 
rendered must fail, as she received the benefit of the bargain of her 
relationship with defendant.  He provided for her support and those 
expenses which he approved, for as long as she resided with him.
116
 
When Carney eventually did leave Hansell, she moved in with her 
mother with only her personal belongings and a small disability income.  
Hansell retained the business.  One would think that the court could have 
awarded Carney the same salary or other compensation as Hansell.  The 
court said:  "There is no question that she was instrumental in assisting 
defendant in building his business and in helping it grow."
117
  Or the court 
could have attempted some approximation of the market value of Carney’s 
contribution to the business. 
In Maglica, Anthony and Clare lived together for twenty years as 
husband and wife.
118
  Mr. Maglica had owned a machine shop business 
since the 1950s.  When Anthony and Clare began living together "they 
worked side by side to build the business," which began manufacturing 
flashlights.
119
  They had equal salaries.
120
  "Thanks in part to some great 
ideas and hard work on Claire’s part (e.g., coming out with a purse-sized 
flashlight in colors), the business boomed."
121
  By the time of their 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. at 136–37. 
 116. Id. at 135. 
 117. Id. at 134. 
 118. Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 103 (Cal. Dis. Ct. App. 1998). 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  The hypothetical in Illustration 11 has both partners having been paid below 
market salaries.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 
cmt. e., illus. 11 (2011) ("Salaries paid to both parties by the corporation were artificially 
low . . . .").  Maglica does not discuss whether the salaries in that case were below market or 
not.  Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 103 (Cal. Dis. Ct. App. 1998).  Illustration 11 
would provide the partner without title to stock the difference between the market rate of her 
work and the salary she received, unless she could prove a contract to share the business or 
that her partner had defrauded her. 
 121. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103. 
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separation, the business, Mag Instrument, Inc., was worth "hundreds of 
millions of dollars."
122
 
When the business was incorporated "all shares went into Anthony’s 
name."
123
  Clare and Anthony parted after Clare learned that he was 
transferring the stock to his children, but not to her.  She brought suit.  The 
jury awarded her $84 million in unjust enrichment.
124
  The California 
Appellate Court reversed, however, holding that because she was not an 
equity partner, she was not entitled to the product of her work, but only the 
reasonable value of her services.  The Appellate Court said:  "It is one thing 
to require that the defendant be benefited by services, it is quite another to 
measure the reasonable value of those services by the value by which the 
defendant was ‘benefited’ as a result of them. . . . ," [and a] "resulting 
benefit is an open-ended standard, which . . . can result in the plaintiff 
obtaining recovery amounting to de facto ownership in a business all out of 
reasonable relation to the value of services rendered."
125
  Given that the 
court had credited Mrs. Maglica’s "great ideas and hard work"126 to the 
business’ success, it is hard to see why $84 million out of "hundreds of 
millions of dollars"
127
 was "all out of reasonable relation to the value of 
services rendered."
128
  
The outcomes of Carey and Maglica may be appropriate for business 
colleagues.  Those working together would most likely not enter into an 
arrangement whereby one owned the business and the other, despite 
working as a partner, was content with a salary.  More likely, they would 
negotiate an express contract for a partnership or other sharing 
arrangement.  Even if they did not, the scope of the relationship between 
the two would probably not be unspoken. 
Section 28 is premised on the fact that cohabitants are not in a business 
relationship and that business rules are therefore inapplicable.
129
  If 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  The court’s use of the passive voice makes it impossible for the reader to know 
who initiated the titling of the stock, but one can surmise. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 126. Id. at 103. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 105. 
 129. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. b 
(2011) ("A standard objection to restitution in related contexts—the argument that the 
asserted obligation should properly have been the subject of a contract between the parties—
is ordinarily disregarded when restitution is allowed between former cohabitants.").  
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cohabitants were dealing with someone other than their partner, they could 
be viewed as having assumed the risk that their labor would benefit 
someone else.  In the context of a terminated marriage-like relationship, 
however, what might appear donative can become "an interrupted exchange 
or a conditional gift" and what might appear appropriate for a contract is 
not always viewed as contractual.
130
  Lack of a contract does not mean, 
therefore, as implied by Carey and Maglica, that the non-owner cohabitant 
would have expected to be cut out of the business at any time, with only a 
salary for services, but not any of the traceable results of her work.  
The rationale of Illustration 11 is that restitution for services 
performed by a cohabitant should be the services’ value and "not their 
traceable product" because "restitution regards the defendant in such 
circumstances as the innocent recipient of a noncontractual transfer, not as a 
wrongdoer.  Liability is accordingly for the value of benefits received, not 
for their potentially more valuable product (a form of consequential 
gain)."
131
 
The premise that Christopher Hansell and Anthony Maglica were 
"innocent recipients of noncontractual transfers" is not persuasive.  Hansell 
and Maglica knew they were accepting their partners’ services and were 
refusing to provide their partners with a share in the businesses.  There is no 
compelling reason why the "value" of services is only the hourly wage or 
salary that would attend an employee’s doing them, particularly if the 
partner’s activities are of an inventive or capital-producing nature.  Hansell 
took advantage of Carney’s needy predicament to make her choose between 
leaving with nothing or staying with food and shelter for herself and their 
son.
132
  Anthony Maglica never informed Clare that she had no ownership 
stake in the business to which she contributed "some great ideas and hard 
work."
133
 
Some cases cited in the Reporter’s Notes to Section 28 take a different 
road to relief:  They suggest that Christoper Hansell, Anthony Maglica, and 
others like them should be estopped from claiming ownership of all of the 
proceeds of joint efforts.  One court awarded an equitable distribution of 
property, saying: 
Where, as here, the man accepted the benefit of such services, he will not 
be heard to argue that he did not need them and that their economic value 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. § 28 cmt. e. 
 132. Carney v. Hansell, 831 A.2d 128, 132–34 (N.J. 2003) 
 133. Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 103 (Cal. Dis. Ct. App. 1998).  
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should not be considered as the woman’s economic contributions to the 
joint accumulation of property between them.
134 
Similarly another case cited in the Reporter’s Notes stated that one cannot be 
enriched by an unrequested benefit when one could have declined its 
receipt,
135
 and that: 
It would be unjust for [one party] to assert in one breath that [the other 
party] can in no way be presumed to be his [spouse] for purposes of either 
the dissolution of marriage statutes or the concept of putative spouse and 
to assert in another the presumption that she rendered her services 
voluntarily and gratuitously.
136
 
Section 52 of the Restatement (Third) recognizes that a recipient can be 
responsible for his enrichment even though he is not a conscious 
wrongdoer.
137
  In such case he "may be subject to a greater liability in 
restitution than an innocent recipient."
138
 
Limiting a plaintiff’s recovery only to the value of her services would 
appear to be inconsistent with one of the options under Section 49(3), which 
says that enrichment can be measured by "the value of the benefit in 
advancing the purposes of the defendant."
139
  If one’s services increase the 
value of assets that are titled in the other’s name, then it would appear that the 
services "advanced the purposes" of that partner.  The limitation against 
recovering the "traceable product" of the services found in Illustration 11 also 
appears to be inconsistent with other illustrations to Section 28.
140
  
2.  Recovery Based on Value from Acquired Assets 
Other illustrations in Section 28 describe remedies that appear 
inconsistent with the limitation of Illustration 11.  For example, Illustration 1 is 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 876 (Miss. 1986); see also infra Part VI.C.2 
(discussing Pickens). 
 135. See Turner v. Freed, 792 N.E.2d 947, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).  
 136. Id. at 950 n.3 (brackets in original) (quoting Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 
1332 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)). 
 137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 52 (2011) 
("A defendant who is not a conscious wrongdoer may nevertheless be responsible for 
receiving, retaining, or dealing with the benefits that are the subject of a restitution claim." 
(internal cross reference omitted)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. § 49(3)(a). 
 140. See id. § 28 cmt. e., illus. 11.  See generally id.§ 28. 
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based on Pickens v. Pickens.
141
  There, a couple divorced after having been 
married for fourteen years and having had five children.  A year after their 
divorce, they began living together but did not remarry.  They stayed together 
for another twenty years and had two more children.  After their final 
separation the trial court ordered an "equitable distribution" of the property 
based on unjust enrichment, not the laws of divorce.
142
  The trial court found 
that Mr. and Mrs. Pickens contributed equally to the family and accumulation 
of property even though Mr. Pickens earned more than Mrs. Pickens.  The 
court said that despite the disparity of earnings, "she did the housework, and in 
my judgment the two [Pickens] were equal in their contributions to the ongoing 
of the family and the accumulation of the portion of the property now 
owned."
143
 
Similarly, the court in Pederson v. Anibas,
144 
on which Illustration 5 is 
based,
145
 held that although a log cabin was titled only in the man’s name, the 
woman was entitled to half of the proceeds of its sale.
146
  It said that her 
payments for some household expenses "freed up his earnings" so he could buy 
the land, and that her work doing "the majority of cooking, laundry and 
household chores . . . free[d] up time" for him to work on building the cabin.
147
 
Additionally the court found that she fed the workers and helped grind logs.
148
 
D.  Helpmate Services 
1.  Valuable or Not 
If unjust enrichment is measured by the value of services instead of the 
value of the product, then a court will need to decide which services to 
compensate and how to value them.  Both the "which" and "how" are difficult 
to determine when the services are provided to help and take care of one’s 
partner and children, if any. 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872 (Miss. 1986). 
 142. Id. at 875. 
 143. Id. at 874. 
 144. See Penderson v. Anibas, No. 00-2940, 2001 WL 969176 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 
2001). 
 145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. d, illus. 
5 (2011)  
 146. See Penderson, 2001 WL 969176, at *1. 
 147. Id. at *2.  
 148. Id. 
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As in Pickens and Pederson, the plaintiffs in many cohabitation cases 
are women who perform domestic and other helpmate services, to their 
economic disadvantage. In both of those cases, the courts divided the 
property between the partners.  Despite those cases, Section 28 discusses 
the relevance of "domestic services" in two different comments with 
differing emphases.  One appears to allow division of cohabitants’ assets 
based on the "domestic services" of one of the partners while the other does 
not.  Comment c to Section 28 notes that assets may be divided "when the 
equities favoring the claimant are sufficiently compelling . . . even where 
the claimant’s contribution consists primarily of domestic services . . . ."149  
Comment d, however, states that the type of contributions that aid in the 
creation of an asset do not need to be "of any particular kind," but that 
claims "based purely on domestic services are less likely to succeed, 
because services of this character tend to be classified among the reciprocal 
contributions normally exchanged between cohabitants whether married or 
not."
150
  
Comment d’s analogy to marriage is unfortunate.  Reciprocal services 
exchanged between spouses do not lack value, nor are spouses unprotected 
in the case of separation.  Divorce laws do not allow one spouse to keep all 
of the assets when the parties separate, even when the other has performed 
"purely" domestic services.
151
  Separating spouses have other protections.  
While people who have not worked for a salary are not covered by Social 
Security and therefore not eligible for disability or retirement benefits, a 
spouse is eligible for those benefits derivatively on the basis of her 
husband’s salary whether or not she had earned income.152  Someone 
divorced after having been married ten years or more has the same 
protections.
153
  No matter how long someone lives in a marriage-like 
                                                                                                                 
 149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. c 
(2011). 
 150. Id. § 28 cmt. d. 
 151. Many criticize divorce laws as inadequately protecting the more financially 
vulnerable spouse.  See generally, e.g., Kelly, supra note 99.  That, however, is not a reason 
to avoid adequate remedies to cohabitants. It may well be a reason to change the divorce 
laws.   
 152. See 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2006) (providing that a spouse can recover old age, 
disability, or surviving child benefits that derive from his or her spouse’s eligibility for 
social security benefits from his or her employment).   
 153. See id. (providing that divorced spouses are similarly entitled to those benefits if 
they were married ten years or more and had not remarried). 
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relationship, however, that person will not have any access to Social 
Security benefits except on the basis of her own earnings, if any.
154
  
Disallowing recovery for purely domestic services ignores the concept 
of comparative advantage where people, like countries, divide services or 
production of goods between them based on their respective abilities and 
then exchange their services or goods to maximize efficiency.  In cases of 
intimate relationships, a couple may allocate duties so that one is the 
primary earner while the other is the primary homemaker.  This allocation 
may be based on comparative abilities, or, often, based on cultural norms.
155  
In awarding an equitable division of property between the Pickens, the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi said:  
As any freshman economics student knows, services and in kind 
contributions have an economic value as real as cash contributions.  In 
such situations, where one party to the relationship acts without 
compensation to perform work or render services to a business 
enterprise or performs work or services generally regarded as domestic 
in nature, these are nevertheless economic contributions.
156
 
While Mrs. Pickens contributed some earnings to the household, nothing in 
the Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion indicated that Mrs. Pickens would 
not have recovered if she had performed only homemaking services.  
2.  Offsets 
As the Supreme Court of Mississippi noted in Pickens, services in kind 
and services for money are both economic contributions.  Thus, both 
contribute to the household’s acquisition of wealth.  Carney, discussed 
above, held to the contrary using an offset method.
157
  
                                                                                                                 
 154. See generally Laura C. Bornstein, Homemakers and Social Security:  Giving 
Credits Where Credits are Due, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 255 (2009).  Bornstein 
advocates for Social Security reform for "homemakers."  See generally id. 
 155. Judge Posner has said that women are paid less than men because they spend more 
time with their children, and that if wages for traditionally male jobs are depressed and those 
for traditionally female jobs are inflated, then "[l]abor will be allocated less efficiently." Am. 
Nurses’ Ass’n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 719–20 (7th Cir. 1986).  His premise seems to be 
that it is more efficient for women rather than men to care for children. 
 156. Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 876 (Miss. 1986); see also supra Part VI.C.2 
(discussing Pickens). 
 157. Supra notes 110–20 and accompanying text.  
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A case similar to Carney is cited in the Reporter’s Notes to support 
Illustration 2.
158
  Illustration 2, based on Mitchell v. Moore,
159
 describes a 
case in which the offset method is appropriately used based on the facts 
given.  There, male partners are both fully employed, but one also performs 
unsalaried work in the other’s home and business while supported by the 
other.  Illustration 2 says, "benefits conferred . . . in the course of the 
parties’ relationship were adequately compensated by benefits received."160  
Given that both work full time, it would appear that neither is dependent on 
the other.  Nothing in the facts indicates that the one performing unsalaried 
work during his spare time was worse off than if he had not been in the 
relationship.  Nor does it appear that the other was better off.  
Many cohabitants are not financially dependent upon the other.  So 
long as neither sacrifices that independence to care for the other, whatever 
contributions made between them most likely do set each other off.  But 
what of Joann Carney?  Is she in the same position as the fully employed 
man who performed unsalaried work for his partner in exchange for 
support?  She was totally dependent upon Christopher Hansell.  Assuming 
she had not worked in the business, but just took care of Hansell, the home, 
and the child, is justice served when Hansell is able to leave her with 
nothing on the theory that she had been supported by him while she was 
with him?  She must move in with her mother with nothing but a small 
disability income and a few possessions:  He keeps the house and all 
income and assets acquired during the time of their cohabitation.  Has he 
been unjustly enriched? 
Drawing the line between Mitchell v. Moore and Carney v. Hansell is 
not easy, but that does not mean it should not be drawn.  The following 
case, Tarry v. Stewart,
161
 cited in support of Illustration 2, would seem to be 
on the other side of the line from Mitchell, and much more like Carney.  
Tarry held that the defendant, Don Stewart, had not been unjustly enriched 
when he kept the proceeds from the sale of a house that he had bought.  
Despite noting that both he and the plaintiff, Linda Tarry, had made 
"substantial improvements"
162
 and that "as a result of the repairs . . . Stewart 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio Ct. App 1994). 
 159. See Mitchell v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1200, 1206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that 
former life partner of farm owner brought action against owner, with whom partner lived for 
thirteen years was not entitled to damages for unjust enrichment). 
 160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. c, illus. 
2 (2011). 
 161. See Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).  
 162. Id. at 2.  
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realized a financial benefit when the property was sold."
163
  Stewart was not 
unjustly enriched, the court held, because both parties "enjoyed the 
improvements made to the house" in the five years they lived there.
164
 
In addition the court held Stewart was not justly enriched in any 
manner.  Stewart and Tarry had lived together for fourteen years and had a 
child three years into their relationship.  Neither had any assets when they 
began living together.  Tarry stopped working until the child was in school.  
Then she "finished her education and began work as a medical 
laboratory technician."
165
  According to the court the defendant supported 
Tarry and their child until he left in 1989, when the child was eleven.
166
  
Stewart and Tarry had pooled their resources for expenses by keeping 
their money in a drawer to use as needed.  The court did not award Tarry 
any of the assets acquired during their cohabitation, however, because there 
was no evidence 
specifically indicating that she paid for assets that Stewart now has.  To 
the contrary, she has only asserted that her contribution to household 
expenses "freed funds to be used in purchasing various assets," and that 
she contributed to the increased value of both the Ninth Street and 
Eastern Heights residences by "investing sweat equity."
167
 
When Stewart left, Tarry had $710.30 in addition to her salary.
168
  She 
started working as a medical technician a few years before their relationship 
ended.
169
  She also had a car and a little furniture, all of which she had had 
before she and Stewart began living together.
170
  Had they not met, 
presumably she would have continued working, accruing a salary and social 
security benefits.  Because they met, they both had a child, but she was the 
one who stopped working, not he.  
According to the court’s analysis, both Tarry and Stewart enjoyed the 
improvements to the house when they were together.  If she and he had the 
same enjoyment, why is he and not she entitled to the value of the 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Id. at 5. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. at 2. 
 166. Id.  There was evidence that Tarry supported Stewart during their last year 
together, but the court did not address that. 
 167. Id. at 4.  The holding that merely freeing up funds for one partner to buy assets 
does not entitle the other to any property interest in the assets is contrary to the holding in 
Pickens v. Pickens. 
 168. Id. at 4. 
 169. Id. at 2.  
 170. Id. at 3.  
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improvements?  Unlike Mitchell v. Moore, it would appear that Tarry is 
financially worse off than if she had not begun living with Stewart. 
Cases involving a lot of money, particularly if they also involve 
celebrities, tend to be resolved on the basis that the life style during the 
relationship offset any costs to the less wealthy partner.  Marvin v. 
Marvin
171
 was such a case.  Many courts cite this case, which was brought 
against actor Lee Marvin, as a leading case for the proposition that one 
cohabitant can bring suit against another.  What many people do not know 
is that when that case reached its conclusion, Michelle Marvin recovered 
nothing, leaving her in the same position as if the California Supreme Court 
had affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of her case as meretricious.172 
Michelle Marvin had claimed that when she moved in with Lee 
Marvin, at his request and with his promise to always support her, she gave 
up her career to make a home for him.  When the relationship terminated, 
she brought suit under theories of contract and unjust enrichment.  After the 
California Supreme Court reinstated the case, the trial court on remand 
found that Michelle was unlikely to be able to return to her prior singing 
career.  The court held that "plaintiff was in need of rehabilitation" and 
awarded her $104,000 "to accomplish such rehabilitation in two years."
173
  
The court of appeal, with one judge dissenting, reversed.  It held that there 
was no authority for an award of "rehabilitation pay."
174
  The court noted 
that the Marvins had no agreement to combine assets or share wealth.  It 
held that Lee was not unjustly enriched by Michelle’s services because 
"plaintiff actually benefited economically and socially from the 
cohabitation of the parties."
175
  
Although the trial court found Michelle "in need," there was no 
discussion of the facts surrounding the need.  The California Supreme Court 
noted that the trial court had found that Lee had given Michelle substantial 
gifts,
176
 but there were no findings as to what remained of the gifts after the 
relationship ended.  The court did not discuss whether Michelle's economic 
171. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).  Marvin is known as the
"palimony" case, but courts do not award the equivalent of alimony to an unmarried partner, 
nor did plaintiff in Marvin receive support.  
172. See generally Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal. App. 1981).
173. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 557.  The trial court also found that Lee tried to "launch"
Michelle in a recording career and to help her "continue" her nightclub singing career.  Id. at 
557 n.3.  Regardless of his attempts, the trial court found that she was "in need."  Id. at 557. 
174. Id. at 577.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 558.
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benefit during the cohabitation would provide any security after the end of 
the relationship.  Were both Lee and Michelle living the good life, with 
only Lee having money for the future? 
There is a danger that the outcome of a case resolved under this theory 
of "you had a good life" not only leaves the plaintiff with the same outcome 
as if her case had been dismissed because of her meretricious life, but it 
also appears to describe a meretricious relationship.  It effectively says that 
the man is not unjustly enriched because he had "paid for her services."  
Further consideration of where the less wealthy cohabitant would have been 
if she had not been living with her former partner and further consideration 
of the less wealthy cohabitant’s current economic status might shed some 
light on whether losses can be offset by the life style. 
3.  Measuring Value 
If enrichment is not measured with reference to acquired assets, then it 
will be measured by the value of the services.  As the sections above 
indicate, finding the value of services is difficult.  Section 49(3) identifies 
"market value of the benefit" as one of five options for measuring 
enrichment.
177
  Section 28 suggests that services should be measured by 
"the value of the services rendered,"
178
 with no reference to any market.  If 
there is no market to use to value the services, then perhaps another one of 
the Section 49(3) options could be used.  Section 49(3) identifies "cost to 
claimant" as one way to measure the value of services.
179
 
Costs can include measuring the value of goods and services, but costs 
can also include foregone opportunities—opportunity costs as economists 
label them.  In most commercial transactions, the reasonable market value 
of services can also be viewed as a measurement of opportunity costs.  If it 
were more productive to provide the services in a more opportune manner, 
an efficient business person would seek out that opportunity.  
Services performed during cohabitation are not based on economic 
efficiencies, however.  When a relationship turns out not as expected, and 
one partner leaves with a disproportionate share of the assets, that person 
has been benefited by the value of the services of the less affluent partner.  
Loss of opportunity costs might reflect the actual value of the services, but 
                                                                                                                 
 177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49(3) (2011). 
 178. Id. § 28 cmt. e.  
 179. Id. § 49(3)(b). 
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that might be no easier to value than services generally.
180
  Where would 
the plaintiff be if she had not stopped working to care for a home?  Where 
would a plaintiff be if she spent $100,000 on her education instead of her 
partner’s?  How would she have protected her future if she had not 
expected to be supported, often based on assurances by her partner? How 
important to the calculation is the length of the relationship? 
While some might argue that measuring opportunity costs is 
speculative, so too is putting any monetary value on domestic services.  A 
remedy is not speculative just because the amount of damage is not easily 
measurable.  Many cases involve recovery where the amount is difficult to 
measure.  In particular, through wrongful death suits the survivors may 
recover lost earnings of someone killed early in life.
181
  A remedy is only 
speculative if the fact of damage is uncertain.  If one partner accepts the 
domestic services of the other, that partner is unjustly enriched by those 
services, so the fact of damage is clear.
182
  
VII.  Conclusion 
While financially vulnerable cohabitants may have a contract with 
their partner to share assets if the relationship should terminate, many do 
not, as Section 28 recognizes.
183
  Without a contract or state laws favoring 
recovery for cohabitants, the only protection that the partner without assets 
has is the law of restitution.  Without it, the one with title to the assets that 
were acquired during the relationship could leave the other who provided 
domestic services or services directly increasing the value of the assets with 
nothing or next to nothing and with no security for the future.  The 
inclusion of Section 28 in the Restatement (Third) is an appropriate 
recognition that barriers to one cohabitant bringing suit against another 
have been or should be eroded.  Section 28 also reveals the complexity in 
measuring the remedies.  Difficulty in measuring those remedies, however, 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See Estin, supra note 98, at 1006–14 (discussing opportunity costs as part of 
measuring human capital). 
 181. See, e.g., Baird v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 349 N.E.2d 413, 418 
(Ill. 1976) (upholding damages awarded for wrongful death of teens based on economic 
testimony). 
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 183. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 cmt. b 
(2011) ("A standard objection to restitution in related contexts—the argument that the 
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should not justify backsliding to the result of the "meretricious" relationship 
cases or rendering hollow Section 28’s recognition of a restitution claim in 
cohabitation disputes.  
